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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
LYNDA M. KOZLOWICZ, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF FOR REHEARING TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT 
OF APPEALS 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals error when it affirmed Ms. 
Kozlowicz's conviction pursuant to her plea of no contest 
ruling that her challenge to State trial court jurisdiction, 
based on that she is an Indian. . . that a plea of guilty does 
not waive a claim that the court lacks power to adjudicate a 
charge against the Appellant, BlackLedge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 
21, 30-31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2103-04, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); I 
Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 175, at 623-
33 (1982)...the issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time. -rSlasmann v. Second District Court, 80 
Utah 1,7,12, P.2d 861, 86 ( 1 9 3 2 ) , appellant jurisdiction of 
this case would ordinarily lie with the Utah Court Appeals, 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp . 1988) , because of the 
importance of the question presented. Ex Port Crow Dog, 109 
U.S. 556. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION AND 
ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals opinion, State v. Gardner, appears 
* 
* 
Case No. 950461-CA 
1 
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46. It was entered by the Court on March 
18, 1992.".'.A*. .Kozlowizc, did ask for rehearing of the case by 
the Court of Appeals, and that of 48 U.S.C. 1451, 1452. 
Appellant asserts that all grounds for granting certiorari 
listed in Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, exist 
here. As explained in this brief, the only possible viable 
grounds for review by this Court, that's found in Rule 4 6 , ( d ) ; 
"When the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of Municipal, State, or Federal Law which has not 
been addressed but should be, settled by the Supreme 
Court." that of the case EX PORTE CROW DOG, 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATUTES 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States 
Constitution vests the United States Congress with the power 
"[t]o regulate commerce...with the Indian Tribes." 
Article III of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent 
part that, absent the consent of the United States to do 
otherwi se; 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that 
they forever disclaim all rights and title to the unappro-
priated public lands lying within the boundaries hereof, and 
to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any 
Indian or Indian Tribes, and that until the title thereto 
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same 
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United 
States, and said Indian.. 1 and:s shall* remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a challenge to State trial court 
jurisdiction, based upon Appellant's claim of Indian status, 
and the fact that the charged crime took place in Roosevelt, 
2 
Utah, within the Original Boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Indian Reservation. State v. Gardner,, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 
47 & n.l (Utah App. March 18, 1 9 9 2 ) . The Court of Appeals 
rejected this challenge 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
APPELLANT DEMONSTRATES LEGAL CONFLICT A DEPARTURE 
FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE 
COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION OF HER APPEAL. 
Appellant ask this Court to "clarify" the limits and 
boundaries of Indian status jurisdictional challenge 
consistent with State Constitutional provisions and State v. 
Hagen...Appellant suggests that the opinion in this case 
conflict with the Court of Appeals opinion in Hagen, 802 P.2d 
745 (Utah App. 1990) cert, granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) . 
Hagen deal with two issues; (1) whether certain areas 
within the outer boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation have been "disestablished" and are no longer 
"Indian Country"; and (2) whether the question of defendant 
Hagen's Indian status should have been remanded to the trial 
court for further finding that Hagen was not a Ute Tribal 
Member, 802 P.2d at 747. In affirming Appellant's conviction 
the Court of Appeals simply assumed that those issues, if 
reached, would be resolved in Appellant's favor, Gardner, 182 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 & n.l. However, those issues were not 
reached because the appeal was decided on a different, federal 
statutory ground. Thus the Court avoided any conflict with 
this ground for granting certiorari under Utah R. App. 
3. 
p . 4 6 ( a ) . Appellant has shown conflict between the Court of 
Appeals decision and any opinion of this Court on a question 
of State or Federal law pertinent to this case, upon which 
certiorari might be granted under Utah R. App. p. 4 6 ( b ) . . 
POINT TWO 
THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW DECIDED BY 
THE COURT OF APPEALS NEED TO REVISITED BY THIS 
COURT 
This Court may grant certiorari to review a Court of 
Appeals decision on an "important question of Municipal, 
State, or Federal law....", Utah R. App. p. 4 6 ( d ) . The 
question of whether Ute Tribal Member (Indian ) , are subject 
to State Court criminal jurisdiction is important, however, 
there is need for this Court to review the issue. 
This accords with settled federal law, including that of 
the Federal District Court. The Court of Appeals correctly 
aligned itself with this authoritative federal law regarding 
State jurisdiction over Ute Tribal Member (Indian), and the 
assumption of jurisdiction by the optional States. 
In addition to conferring criminal and civil jurisdiction 
on six named states. Public Law 280 authorized all other 
states to assume such jurisdiction over Indian Country if they 
chose P.L. 280, §7, 67 Stat. 588, 5 9 0 ( 1 9 5 3 ) . Under this 
provision there have been total or partial assumptions of 
jurisdiction by the following states: Arizona, Florida, 
Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah and 
Washington. The manner in which these optional states assumed 
jurisdiction varied greatly, ranging from total assumptions of 
both criminal and civil jurisdiction, Fla. Stat. Ann §285.16, 
d 
to a very limited assumption for the purposes of regulating 
only air pollution, Ariz. Rec. Stat. Ann, §49-561. Other 
states assumed jurisdiction over certain reservations, Mont. 
Code Ann. §§ 2-1-301 to 306, or over certain offenses, Wash. 
Rev. Code §§ 37.12.010-070. 
There was considerable doubt about the validity of partial 
assumptions of jurisdiction under Public Law 280 as it was 
originally passed, because it authorized the optional states 
to assume jurisdiction "as provided for in this Act." Since 
the mandatory states were given total jurisdiction, an 
argument could be made that. optional states had to assume all 
civil or criminal jurisdiction or none. Otherwise the states 
might simply assume advantageous portions of jurisdiction and 
leave the most expensive or difficult enforcement problems to 
the tribe or federal government. Goldberg, Public Law 280; The 
Limits of S t al: e Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 535, 548-49, 553-55(1975). In 1968 Congress 
eliminated all doubt about the validity of partial assumption 
of jurisdiction made after that date; it amended Public Law 
280 to permit the states to assume "such measure of 
jurisdiction over any or all such offenses committed within 
such Indian Country or any part thereof" and "such measure of 
jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action 
arising within such Indian Country or any part thereof" as the 
state might choose to acquire with the consent of the tribes. 
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 3 2 1 ( a ) , 1 3 2 2 ( a ) . There still remained a 
question whether partial assumptions of jurisdiction occurring 
before 1968 were valid, but the Supreme Court settled the 
5 
issue in Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). In that case the 
Court upheld an incredibly complicated partial assumption of 
jurisdiction by the State of Washington that has occurred in 
1963. The Court reasoned that the selective assumption was 
authorized by § 7 of Public Law 280, which permitted the 
optional states to assume jurisdiction "in such manner" as the 
people of the State, by the legislative action, bound 
themselves to assume P.L. 280,§ 7. 67 'Stat. 588, 590 (1953). 
The Yakima case also settled another major controversy 
that had surrounded the assumption of jurisdiction by some of 
the Western States. These states had clauses in their 
constitutions disclaiming all title to Indian Lands and 
providing that such lands should "remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of Congress of the United States * * 
*." E.g. Wash. Const. Art. XXVI. These disclaimers had been 
required by the relevant congressional enabling acts as 
conditions of admission into the Union. As a consequence, 
they could not be amended without the consent of Congress. 
Congress expressly gave its consent in §6 of Public Law 280 
"to the people of any state to amended, where necessary, their 
state constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, 
to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act." P.L. 280, §6, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953). Several of 
of the disclaimer states, however, simply assumed jurisdiction 
under Public Law 280 by statute, without bothering to amend 
their constitutions. This omission raised substantial 
ft 
questions about the validity of the assumptions -of 
jurisdiction. In the Yakima case, the Supreme Court had to 
face these questions because Washington had passed its 
assumption of jurisdiction without modifying the disclaimer in 
its state constitution. After extensive analysis, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Congress had not intended to require such 
an amendment if state law itself did not require it. 
Washington's assumption of jurisdiction was therefore upheld. 
Perhaps the greatest criticism of Public Law 280 was that 
it permitted the states to assume jurisdiction- without the 
consent of the concerned tribes. Congress reacted to this 
criticism in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 by amending 
Public Law 280 to provide that no states could assume 
jurisdiction thereafter without the consent of the tribe or, 
tribes concerned, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 3 2 1 ( a ) , 1 3 2 2 ( a ) . This 
consent may only be obtained by a majority vote of the adult 
Indians of the tribe in a special election. 25 U.S.C.A. §1326. 
As a result of this provision, there has been only one 
assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280 since 1968 
that of Utah and Utah bound itself to retrocede that 
jurisdiction whenever a tribe requests it by a majority vote 
at a special election. Utah Code Ann. §63-36-15. It is not 
likely that many states will agree to such a provision, and 
the result is that the 1968 amendments have largely halted 
further expansion of Public Law 280 jurisdiction. The 1968 
amendments are not retroactive, however, they do not 
invalidate those assumptions of jurisdiction made without 
Indian consent prior to 1968 nor do they affect the 
7 
jurisdiction originally conferred on the mandatory states. 
United States v. Hoodie, 588 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1978); we note 
that the fact that the events of interest here may have 
occurred within the right-of-way for a state highway U.S. 40 
avails the state nothing. Right-of-way U.S. 40 running 
through the Reservation remain part of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ute 
Tribal police, Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.DAK. 
1973). ' • . . ; • ' ; 
The existence of the optional provisions of Public Law 280 
has had an important collateral effect. The Supreme Court has 
held that Public Law 280 provides the exclusive method by 
which states may acquire jurisdiction over Indian Country, and 
that conclusion has resulted in the invalidation of less 
formal acquisitions of state power. In Kennerly v. District 
Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971), a tribal council had by resolution 
provided that civil jurisdiction over suits against Indians 
should be concurrent in the state and the tribe. The state 
court exercised jurisdiction in such a case, but the Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the state could not acquire 
jurisdiction without following the requirements of Public Law 
280 as amended by the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act. 
Fort Berthold I and II, 467 U.S. 138(1984) and 476 U.S. 
877 (1986), that the failure of the State of Ariz; to assume 
general Public Law 280 jurisdiction was used by the Supreme 
Court of Arizona, to reinforce its conclusion that state had 
no power to tax income earned by Indian in Indian Country. 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Com'n. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
8 
As a threshold matter, it is critical to understand the 
jurisdictional significance of reservation boundaries, it is 
well-established that, absent express congressional 
authorization, the states have no criminal, civil, regulatory, 
or taxing jurisdiction over the affairs of Indians within 
Indian Country. Oklahoma Tax Comm's v. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 
U.S. 505, 511 (1991); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indian, 480 U.S. 202, 207 & n.5 (1987); Decoteau v. District 
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 & n.2 (1975); Ute Indian Tribe 
v. Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072 (1981), aff'd in part, re\/l± in part 
on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1298 (1985), Once Congress has 
established a reservation, all lands within it remain a part 
of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress. 
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285, 30 S.Ct. 93, 94 
(1909). Neither Utah Courts nor the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the jurisdictional status of those lands and 
thus, Haqen can not be read as contradicting the Tribe's 
position. Those lands remain part of the reservation, subject 
to tribal and federal jurisdiction. Even if the claim is 
based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the 
individual officers conduct conformed to official conduct or 
practice. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 
F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 
797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986), whose actions we have here 
held to be "under color of state law" their actions cannot be 
said to have been authorized by tribal law. Ex Parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453-54, 52 L.Ed, 714 
(1907) (enforcement of unconstitutional act by state official 
9 
is a proceeding without the authority of any one which does 
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental 
capacity). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court erred when affirming Appellant's conviction on 
legal grounds that is consistent with established federal law. 
Accordingly, there is need for this court to review this case, 
and the Appellant for writ of certiorari to Utah Supreme Court 
should be granted. 
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